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Bork and Beethoven
Richard A. Posner*
Commentary magazine is distinguished for the lucidity and forthrightness of its articles and for its singleminded advocacy of a "neoconservative" philosophy built around the related themes of conservative social
and cultural values, aggressive anti-Communism, and determined opposition to the egalitarian programs espoused by liberal Democrats and
university radicals. I have been a faithful reader of the magazine for
many years and my strong impression is that it does not knowingly publish articles that deviate from this party line. Yet the February 1990
issue contains two articles that take opposite positions on the issue of
"originalism"-that is, interpretive fidelity to a text's understanding by
its authors. The tension between the articles is masked by the fact that
one is about Robert Bork and the other is about musical performance
and by the further fact that both embrace the neoconservative creed.
Nevertheless there is a deep and illuminating fissure between them.
Bork Revisited, by Terry Eastland,' public relations director of the
Department ofJustice for most of the Reagan era, including the period
of Bork's unsuccessful run for the Supreme Court, discusses three
books about the Bork debacle, including Bork's own. 2 Eastland's main
purposes are to show that there really was an unprecedented as well as
unsavory left-wing campaign against Bork's confirmation, and that the
Justice Department should not be blamed for Bork's defeat, since the
handling of the confirmation process had been assigned to the White
House staff rather than to the Department. The latter point, while important to Eastland's amour propre, is of no general interest, not least
because Bork would have been defeated (it is clear in hindsight) even if
his campaign had been handled more adroitly, which the Department
of Justice might or might not have done. It is a fact that Bork was the
target of a scurrilous scare campaign orchestrated by left-wingers, but
Eastland is wrong to suppose that this is something new. Notably vicious political battles over Supreme Court nominees took place at the
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. The excellent comments of Dennis Black, Frank Easterbrook,
Thomas Grey, Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein on a previous draft are gratefully acknowledged-but none of these gentlemen is to be deemed complicit in my argument or

conclusions.
1. COMMENTARY, Feb. 1990, at 39.
2. ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING

OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

(1989).
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very outset of our constitutional history. 3 This should matter to an
originalist, and therefore to Eastland. He describes Bork's book as
"the best single volume we have on the great constitutional issues that
now divide the nation,"'4 and applauds it for its effort "to rescue the
integrity and independence of the law from those who would politicize
it. ''5 The project of this book he loves is the defense of originalism; in
Eastland's paraphrase of Bork, the "recovery of the once dominant
view of constitutional law, which is that courts should apply the Constitution according to the principles intended by those who ratified the
6
document."
One might expect reinforcement of the originalist approach from
"Cutting Beethoven Down to Size," by Commntary's music critic, Samuel Lipman. 7 For it is an article about the authentic-performance
movement, which is to musical interpretation what originalism is to
legal interpretation. The movement involves "the required employment of original instruments-instruments resembling as closely as
possible those on which the music was to be played at the time of its
composition"; "reliance on what remains of the composer's original
text, freed of all inadvertent error in transmission and publication, and
of all subsequent editorial emendation"; and "the use of original performance styles-the complete observance of the composer's explicit
indications, and an untiring attempt to recover all that can be known of
the unwritten, customary, and taken-for-granted methods of deciphering and implementing his written notation."'8 Thus, "[in authentic performances the sought-after styles, including details of rhythmic
execution, instrumental techniques, and concert pitch, are those contemporaneous with the composer-the exact way a composer might
have heard his works when they were first rendered, at the time of their
composition or shortly thereafter, by the best and most representative
executants of the day." 9 This sounds much like Bork's originalism, yet it soon becomes apparent that Lipman hates the authentic-performance movement.
"Whereas the new approach is based on the use of scholarship to recapture a lost material reality of physically existing instruments, written
texts, and definable styles, the best that has gone on over the past century and more in concert halls and opera houses has stressed spiritual
3. "The rejection of John Rutledge for the Supreme Court in 1795 supports the view
that politically motivated votes [on confirmation of Supreme Court nominees] are legitimate,
if not desirable, under our system of divided appointment power." James E. Gauch, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme CourtAppointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 365 (1989) (student author).
4. Eastland, supra note 1, at 39.
5. Id. at 42.
6. Id. at 43 (paraphrasing R. Bornx, supra note 2, at 143). Unless otherwise indicated,
page references are to Bork's book.
7. COMMENTARY, Feb. 1990, at 53.

8. Id
9. Id at 54.
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insight-the empathic projection of the minds and talents of performers into the creative souls of great composers."' 0 Lipman's particular
be'te
noire is the English conductor Roger Norrington, whose performances of Beethoven's symphonies
are short-winded, the music does not breathe. Because the music does
not breathe, this quintessentially passionate music conveys no passion.... These performances are, in short, consistently bad-and what
is bad about them is precisely the result of the fleshing-out of all the
absurd musico-intellectual pretensions of the authentic performance
movement.
...It is no defense.., to adduce Beethoven's metronome markings
as justification for these musical crimes. Any musician with experience
in playing music by living composers knows that of all their performance directions, metronome markings are the least viable, consistent,
and trustworthy. 1'
The reasons for the unreliability of living composers' metronome markings, reasons that Lipman thinks equally applicable to Beethoven,
include distance in time from the work's actual composition, inexperience with the requirements of performance, a frequent disdain for the
very fact of performance, and above all the composer's preexisting and
complete knowledge of the content and structure of the music, a
audience-and few performers either--can be exknowledge which no
2
pected to possess.'
A striking feature of Lipman's essay-redeeming it for Commentary
orthodoxy-is his attributing the authentic-performance movement
not, as one might expect, to cultural conservatism but instead to cultural radicalism, aesthetic relativism, and the egalitarian obsessions of
intellectuals. Norrington's "all-out attack on the foundations of Beeeffort to humble oncethoven's greatness" is part of "the postmodern
3
mighty artists, thinkers, and values."'
I do not want to be understood as endorsing Lipman's criticism of
the authentic-performance movement. I am not competent to offer an
evaluation.' 4 Nor do I believe that if one is an originalist in one domain of interpretation one must be an originalist in all.15 Another possibility, moreover, is that the originalist and nonoriginalist approaches
to musical interpretation are equally valid; if so, they can coexist happily, and there is no need to choose between them, whereas if judges
cannot agree on how to interpret statutes and the Constitution, laws
10. fd
11. Id at 56, 57.
12. Id at 57.
13. Id at 56.
14. For a (nonoriginalist) defense of the movement, see Peter Rabinowitz's review of the
Norrington recordings of Beethoven's symphonies in FANFArE, Mar./Apr. 1990, at 134-37.

15. See generally RIcHARD A.

POSNER, LAW AND LrIRATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION

209-68 (1988).
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will lack uniformity and predictability and the society will be in trouble.
What I do contend is that originalism cannot be thought either the natural or the inevitable method of interpreting a given body of texts, or
even the method of interpretation natural or inevitable for conservatives to follow.
It is time to confront directly Bork's arguments on behalf of
originalism in constitutional interpretation. Those arguments form the
core of The Tempting of America. What follows is not a book review, but
lest the critical tenor of my remarks be misunderstood, let me emphasize not only that I have the highest personal and professional regard
for the author but also that The Tempting of America is a fine book which
deserves its best-sellerdom. It is beautifully written. It manages the
nigh-impossible feat of presenting a scholarly thesis in a form accessible to the lay reader. It offers powerful criticisms of particular constitutional theories, doctrines, and decisions. It is free of rancor, even in the
discussion (comprising the last quarter of the book) of the vicious and
dishonest campaign that the American left waged against Bork's confirmation. And it makes as ringing a defense of originalism-the approach which teaches that to a judge interpreting the Constitution "all
that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been
understood at the time [of enactment]"' 6-- as we are likely to hear.
The question I want to consider is whether it is a successful defense.
I think not. Bork fails to produce convincing reasons why society
should want its judges to adopt originalism as their interpretive methodology in constitutional cases. At times, indeed, he seems to want to
place the issue outside the boundaries of rational debate. How else to
explain the religious imagery that permeates his discussion of originalism and its enemies? It begins with the title of the book-The Tempting
ofAmerica. Any doubt that the reference is to the temptation is dispelled
by the title of chapter one-"Creation and Fall"--which begins, "The
Constitution was barely in place when one Justice of the Supreme
Court cast covetous glances at the apple that would eventually cause
the fall."' 17 (This must have been the original constitutional sin.) Bork
embraces the idea that the Constitution is "our civil religion,"' 8 and, he
never tires of repeating, originalism is its "orthodoxy."' 19 Naturally,
then, Bork's oppopents are guilty of "heresy," a term he elucidates with
quotations from the Catholic apologist Hilaire Belloc. 2 0 Since it is heresy, "it is crucial ...to root it out," 2 and therefore "no person should

be nominated or confirmed [for the Supreme Court] who does not dis16. P. 144. Equivalently, "[i]f
the Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like
that of all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended." Id. at
145.
17. P. 19.
18. P. 153.
19. E.g., p. 6.
20. E.g., pp. 4, 11.
21. P. 11.
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play both a grasp of and devotion to the philosophy of original understanding."'2 2 Bork adjures the Supreme Court to "'go and sin no
more,' "23 calls Cardinal Newman and St. Thomas More to his aid
along with Belloc, 2 4 and in a surprising twist compares himself to the
heretic: "If the philosophy of political judging is a heresy in the American system of government, it is the orthodoxy of the law schools and of
the left-liberal culture. I would have done well to remember that in the
old days nobody burned infidels, but they did burn heretics."'2 5
A summons to holy war is not an argument for originalism, and law's
commitment to reason precedes, both logically and temporally, its commitment to originalism. Bork's militance and dogmatism will buck up
his followers and sweep along some doubters but will not persuade the.
rational intellect. One especially wants a better ground than piety for
genuflecting to originalism because Bork rightly if incongruously reminds us of the danger of "absolutisms" and "abstract principles, ' '2 6
criticizes reliance in constitutional law on "history and tradition," 27 and
implies in his interesting discussion of originalism's historical roots that
the nonoriginalist heresy may be part of the original understanding of
the Constitution.2 8 Apparently there was no Eden.
Although the book has no chapter on the reasons why the judiciary
should embrace originalism-a major and I think telling omission-several reasons are mentioned. The first is that it is implicit in our democratic form of government. Originalism is necessary in order to curb
judicial discretion, and curbs on judicial discretion are necessary in order to keep the handful of unelected federal judges from seizing the
reins of power from the people's representatives. This argument founders on three shoals. The first is that, for excellent reasons, the democratic (really Bork means the populist) principle is diluted in our system
of government. We do not bave government by plebiscite or referendum. (Some states have referenda, but there are none at the federal
level.) We have representative democracy. The actual policy decisions
are made by agents of the people rather than by the people themselves-precisely so that raw popular desire will be buffered, civilized,
guided, mediated by professionals and experts, and will be informed
through deliberation. Even the representatives do not have a blank
check. They are hemmed in by the Constitution-itself representing,
22. P. 9.
23. P. 159.
24. Pp. 352, 354.
25. P. 343. Not quite nobody: During the Crusades, the Inquisition, and other periods
of Christian zealotry, many Jews, Turks, Arabs, and other infidels were killed on religious
grounds, often by being burnt at the stake.
Despite Bork's fondness for religious imagery, I am sure his calling the "right of privacy"
"a loose canon," p. 97 (emphasis added), is merely a typo.
26. P. 353.
27. P. 119.
28. Pp. 19-27.
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to be sure, popular preferences, since the Constitution was ratified by
popular vote; but they are the preferences of a sliver of a tiny population two centuries ago. The question posed by an originalist versus an
activist or a pragmatic judiciary is not one of democracy or no democracy. It may not even be a question of more or less democracy-are
nations like Great Britain that lack a constitutional court more democratic than the United States? It is a question of the kind of democracy
we want, as Bork himself makes clear in his perceptive criticism of the
29
Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" decisions.
:Second, if democracy is the end, originalism is a clumsy means.
This is apparent from Bork's discussion of the commerce clause of the
Constitution. As he points out, the Supreme Court in the wake of the
New Deal read out of the Constitution the limitations that the clause
places on the powers of the federal government. 30 Bork's originalism
implies that the Court erred. But by erring it transferred power to the
people's representatives, who were in turn responding to an enormous
and sustained tide of public opinion.
The third objection to Bork's democracy-mongering is that, on the
evidence of the book, Bork himself is not an admirer of popular government. And why should he be? His appointment to the Supreme
Court was rejected by the Senate of the United States, which with all its
manifest faults, well documented in Bork's book, is a legislative body of
above-average quality, albeit not so representative as many other such
bodies (no "one person, one vote" there). And he was rejected because of a grass-roots political campaign that he devotes a quarter of
the book to denouncing. The first page of the book warns against "the
temptations of politics," and laments that "politics invariably tries to
dominate" the professions and academic disciplines "that once possessed a life and structure of their own." Later Bork denounces "populism," 3 1 although his implicit definition of democracy is populism-the
conforming of public policy to the popular preferences that he is so
distressed to find the courts now and then thwarting in the name of the
Constitution. He does not explain how increasing the power of legislatures by diminishing that of judges trying to limit legislative power
could be the antidote to the rampant politicization of American life that
he deplores.
The second reason Bork offers in defense of originalism is that it is
neded to preserve the effectiveness of the Supreme Court. He fears
that those who succeed in ousting originalism "will have destroyed a
great and essential institution," namely the Court.3 2 But on Bork's account, the Court has wrought mainly mischief in its two centuries of
existence, so one wonders why he is so passionate to preserve it. He
29. Pp. 84-90.

30. Pp. 56-57.
31. P. 132.
32. P. 2; see also p. 349.
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points out that other Western nations, which do not have courts comparable to our Supreme Court, have roughly the same set of liberties
that we have. The implication is that we could do quite nicely without a
constitutional court.
However this may be, there is no evidence that the Court's authority
depends on adherence to originalism. Bork knows this, for he says (in
great tension with his remark about the destructibility of a great and
essential institution) that "the Court is virtually invulnerable"; it "can
do what it wishes, and there is almost no way to stop it, provided its
result has a significant political constituency. '3 3 This is a sensible observation; the Court's survival and flourishing are indeed more likely to
depend on the political acceptability of its results than on its adherence
to an esoteric philosophy of interpretation. In fact the Court has never
been consistently originalist, yet has survived; perhaps the Justices
know more about survival than their critics do.
Bork argues that if the only criterion for evaluating the Supreme
Court's decisions is their political soundness, anyone who thinks the
Court is politically wrong "is morally justified in evading its rulings
whenever he can and overthrowing it if possible in order to replace it
with a body that will produce results he likes." 34 He adds ominously:
The man who prefers results to processes has no reason to say that the
Court is more legitimate than any other institution capable of wielding
power. If the Court will not agree with him, why not argue his case to
some other group, say the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body with
rather bet35
ter means for enforcing its decisions? No answer exists.
Well, there are plenty of answers, and one is that Bork is posing a false
dichotomy: a court committed
to originalism versus a court that is a
"naked power organ"; 3 6 blind obedience versus rebellion. These dichotomies imply that the only method of justification available to a
court, the only method of channeling judicial discretion and thus of
distinguishing judges from legislators, is the originalist. No other
method-one that emphasizes natural justice, sound justice, social welfare, or neutral (but not necessarily originalist) principles-so much as
exists. There is no middle ground.3 7 Which surely is false.
And it may be doubted whether the forbearance of theJoint Chiefs
of Staff to attempt a takeover of the government of the United States is
dependent to even a tiny degree on the Supreme Court's adherence to
originalism. Judging by the evidence that Bork arrays, the Court has
since the beginning strayed repeatedly from the originalist path, yet the
33. P. 77.
34. P. 265.
35. Id.
36. P. 146.
37. "The truth is that the judge who looks outside the historic Constitution always looks
inside himself and nowhere else." P. 242. Beware any sentence that begins: "The truth is
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Joint Chiefs (or their predecessors) have never tried to take over the
government. Nor are they likely to try. It is not true that the Joint
Chiefs have better means of enforcing their decisions than the Supreme
Court does. If the Joint Chiefs ordered the army to take over the government, their order would not be obeyed. Bork believes that the
Court has issued a parallel order, "taking over" the government from
the elected branches, and that its order has been obeyed. This implies
correctly that, other than in times of general war, the Supreme Court is
more powerful than the Joint Chiefs.
Bork's invocation of the Joint Chiefs proves only that he is almost as
fond of military as of religious imagery. He particularly likes the Leninist metaphor of seizing the "commanding heights" or "high ground." 3 8
Military and religious terms are a common part of our speech ("war,"
"coup d'6tat," "anathema," "devotion," and so forth); it is the density of
these particular systems of imagery in Bork's book that gives the book
its militant and dogmatic tone, and a good deal of its polemical power.
But that power is purchased at a price in accuracy.
Although Bork derides scholars who try to found constitutional doctrine on moral philosophy, it should be apparent by now that he is himself under the sway of a moral philosopher. His name is Hobbes, and
he too thought the only source of political legitimacy was a contract
among people who died long ago. This may have been a progressive
idea in an era when kings claimed to rule by divine right, but it is an
incomplete theory of the legitimacy of the modern Supreme Court.
There are other reasons for obeying a judicial decision besides the
Court's ability to display, like the owner of a champion airedale, an impeccable pedigree for the decision, connecting it to its remote eighteenth-century ancestor. And Bork kriows this, for he believes that
judges should give great weight to precedents, even when a precedent
rests on a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution.3 9
I said that the idea of the Constitution as a binding contract is an
incomplete theory of political legitimacy; I did not say that it is an unsound theory. A contract induces reliance that can make a strong claim
for protection; it also frees people from the necessity for continually
reexamining and revising the terms of their relationship. These values
are independent of whether the original contracting parties are still
alive. But a long-term contract is bound eventually to require, if not
formal modification (which in the case of the Constitution can be accomplished only through the amendment process), then flexible interpretation, to cope effectively with altered circumstances. Modification
and interpretation are reciprocal; the more difficult it is to modify the
instrument formally, the more exigent is flexible interpretation. Bork is
well aware of the practical impediments to amending the Constitution,
38. E.g., pp. 3, 338.
39. See note 92 infra.
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but he is unwilling to draw the inference that flexible interpretation is
therefore necessary to prevent constitutional obsolescence. The
amendment process is too slow, too cumbersome, too easily thwarted
to maintain a living Constitution.
In his advocacy of originalism Bork places considerable weight on
what might be termed the argument from hypocrisy, defined for these
purposes as the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The dominant rhetoric
ofjudges, even activist judges, is originalist, for originalism is the legal
profession's orthodox mode of justification. The judge is the oracle
through which the god (Law) speaks. This stance may reflect a queasiness about the legitimacy-less grandly, the public acceptability--of
nonoriginalist decisions; or it may simply be that judges, like everyone
else, like to foist responsibility for difficult and unpopular decisions on
others. The long-dead framers are a convenient group to whom to pass
the buck, since they can't refuse it. But although judges are not immune from the all too human tendency to deny responsibility for actions that cause pain, the significance of this fact is another matter. It is
a considerable paradox to suggest that the false reasons which uncandid judges give for their actions are the only legitimate grounds for
judicial action.
If the result-oriented or activist judge is queasy about the pedigree
or title deeds of his rulings, the originalist is (on the evidence of Bork's
book, at any rate) queasy about the consequences of originalist rulings.
And rightly so. A theory of constitutional interpretation that ignores
consequences is no more satisfactory than one that ignores the importance of building a bridge between the contemporary judge's pronouncement and some authoritative document from the past. It is
difficult to argue to Americans that in evaluating a political theory they
should ignore its practical consequences. Bork is not prepared to make
such an argument. He continually reassures the reader that originalism
does not yield ghastly results, while at the same time denouncing
judges who are "result-oriented." The argument from hypocrisy can
be turned against originalism. Bork, as we are about to see, is not a
practicing originalist.
1. The doctrine of incorporation holds that the fourteenth amendment makes some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights constraints on state governments. About the validity of the doctrine Bork
says only: "There is no occasion here to attempt to resolve the contro' 40
versy concerning the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.
Why not? The issue is central to determining the contemporary reach
of the Constitution, and Bork is not elsewhere bashful about discussing
controversial issues of constitutional interpretation. His diffidence
here is all the more surprising because a rejection of incorporation is
clearly entailed by his discussion of the only two clauses of the four40. P. 93.
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teenth amendment that could be thought to incorporate the Bill of
Rights. The Supreme Court has used the due process clause, but Bork
is emphatic that all that this clause requires is that states use fair procedures in applying their substantive law. 4 1 It could not, therefore, require the states to respect free speech or the free exercise of religion or
any of the other substantive liberties in the Bill of Rights. As for procedural liberties, since the due process clause of the fifth amendment is, if
it is purely a procedural clause, only one of the procedural clauses of
the Bill of Rights, it is hardly likely, on an originalist construal, that
transposed to the fourteenth amendment it stands for all the other procedural liberties in the Bill of Rights.
The other clause of the fourteenth amendment that might provide a
vehicle for incorporation is the privileges and immunities clause, but
Bork regards it as a "dead letter,"' 4 2 a "cadaver,"' 43 a "corpse,'' 4 4 because its meaning is unascertainable. Even to an originalist, bound to
respect the dead hand of the past, a corpse is not a seemly vehicle for
imposing the Bill of Rights on the states; nor does Bork suggest that it
could be used for this purpose. 45 Among other objections to deriving
the doctrine of incorporation from the privileges and immunities
clause, it would make the due process clause superfluous.
Bork is unwilling to follow the logic of his analysis to its inevitable
conclusion, which is that the doctrine of incorporation is thoroughly
illegitimate. On the contrary, throughout most of the book he takes the
doctrine for granted, as something he has no wish to disturb. 4 6 He
must realize that his originalist position would be rejected out of hand
were it understood to make the Bill of Rights totally inapplicable to the
states. He is being pragmatic, not originalist.
2. No constitutional theory that implies that Brown v. Board of Education 4 7 -which held that public school segregation violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment-was decided incorrectly will receive a fair hearing nowadays, though on a consistent application of originalism it was decided incorrectly. The language of the
equal protection clause, which does not speak of legal equality but of
equal protection of the laws (whatever they may be), and its background in the refusal of law enforcement authorities in southern states
to protect the freedmen against the private violence of the Ku Klux
Klan, suggest that all the clause forbids is the selective withdrawal of
legal protection on racial grounds. A state cannot make black people
outlaws by refusing to enforce the state's criminal and tort law when the
41.
42.
43.
44.

P. 31.
P. 166.
P. 180.
Id

45. In this he is

correct. DAVID

P. CURRIE,

THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT

THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 344-51 (1985); see also pp. 181-82 of Bork's book.
46. P. 49.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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victims of a crime or tort are black. To the consistent originalist that
should be the extent of the clause's reach. Bork points out that the
framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to
bring about social equality between the races and would not have cared
if the failure to achieve such equality inflicted psychological wounds on
blacks. 48 And Bork objects to extracting from a constitutional provision "a concept whose content would so dramatically change over time
that it would come to outlaw things that the ratifiers had no idea of
'4 9
oudawing."
Yet he shies away from concluding that Brown was wrong, and offers
in its defense the following argument:
By 1954, when Brown came up for decision, it had been apparent for
some time that segregation rarely if ever produced equality. Quite

apart from any question of psychology [an irrelevant question, on
Bork's reading of the fourteenth amendment], the physical facilities

provided for blacks were not as good as those provided for whites.
That had been demonstrated in a long series of cases. The Supreme
Court was faced with a situation in which the courts would have to go
on forever entertaining litigation about primary schools, secondary
schools, colleges, washrooms, golf courses, swimming pools, drinking
fountains, and the endless variety of facilities that were segregated, or
else the separate-but-equal doctrine would have to be abandoned. The
Court's realistic choice, therefore, was either to abandon the quest for
equality by allowing segregation or to forbid segregation in order to
achieve equality. 50
So the Court chose equality. But the equal protection clause does not
(on its face anyway) require equality; it requires equal protection of the
laws. The talk of "equality" makes it sound as if Bork is on the side of
the angels, but the passage quoted above shows that Bork favors desegregation only because he believes it the only way of sparing the courts
the bother of monitoring segregated schools (and other facilities) to
make sure they are physically equal. This is an unconvincing reason.
Measurement of physical equality is easier than many things that courts
do. Physical equality of schools could be measured by per-pupil expenditures, by teacher-student ratios, and by other dimensions of effort
or quality. It is also a petty reason-imagine the tinny sound that
would be emitted by a Brown opinion that made the decision turn on
the difficulty of measuring physical equality coupled with indifference
to the psychological impact of segregation. And it is a reason inconsistent with Bork's criticism of Miranda v. Arizona l-a decision explicitly
premised on the administrative costs of ensuring compliance with the
rule against coerced confessions. 52 He does not explain why those
48. P. 76.
49.
50.
51.
52.

P. 214.
P. 82.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
P. 94. In Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IN. LJ. 1, 12-15
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costs should be decisive in race law but illegitimate in criminal law.
There is a grudging quality to Bork's defense of Brown. It emerges
not only in the tortured character of his argument but also in his assimi5
lation of the decision to "liberal" and "egalitarian" policy measures, 3
for Bork considers himself neither a liberal nor an egalitarian. To him,
a liberal is a modem welfare state liberal and an egalitarian is someone
who believes in equality of result, not of opportunity. There is an older
tradition of liberalism, however, the liberalism of John Locke, Adam
Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. They believed in a limited state, and (the last three anyway) would have disapproved of the
efforts of our southern states to use law to back a caste system. This
tradition of liberal thought provides a footing for Brown that does not
require the embrace of the egalitarian principles which Bork deplores.
Indeed, this tradition nourishes the libertarian or free-market strand of
modem conservative thought, a strand not at all egalitarian. The other
strand-call it social conservatism-is rooted in religious ideas and attitudes, in love of stability, and in fear of change. Commentary's neoconservatism is a form of social conservatism. Its spirit suffuses Bork's
book, and is crystallized in such remarks as "no activity that society
thinks immoral is victimless. Knowledge that an activity is taking place
is a harm to those who find it profoundly immoral." 54
3. Bork would use the obscure, and usually assumed to be nonjusticiable, "guarantee" clause in article IV of the Constitution (guaranteeing each state the right to a republican form of government) to
correct extreme forms of legislative malapportionment.5 5 This suggestion confuses republican with democratic and contradicts Bork's own
statement that the clause left the states free to experiment with different forms of government, provided only that state governments did not
become " 'aristocratic or monarchical.' '56
4. Bork suggests that the guarantee clause might also be used to
5 7 If
require states "to avoid egregious deviations from their own laws."
adopted, this suggestion, by making federal judges the final arbiters of
state law, would license a degree of judicial activism that would make
the ghost of Earl Warren blush.
5. Bork notes with apparent approval the suggestion that "if anyone tried to enforce a law that had moldered in disuse for many years,
the statute should be declared void by reason of desuetude. 5 8s He is
(1971), Bork had offered additional arguments for Brown. They are not repeated in his book,
and it is unclear whether Bork still subscribes to them. They are no more convincing than the
argument he does repeat. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 305-07
(1990).
53. Pp. 92-93.
54. P. 123.

55. Pp. 85-86.
56. P. 87 (quoting Madison).
57. P. 86 n.*.
58. P. 96.

HeinOnline -- 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1376 1989-1990

July 1990]

BORK AND BEETHOVEN

1377

referring to the statute banning contraceptives that was struck down in
Griswold v. Connecticut,59 but the logic of "desuetude" applies equally to
the long-unenforced sodomy statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick 6 0-a
decision of which Bork thoroughly approves. 6 1 He does not indicate
where in the Constitution we should look for the desuetude clause.
6. Bork hints that there is a residual power, lurking in some un62
specified provision of the Constitution, to invalidate "horrible" laws,
although he can find no constitutional basis for the decision in Skinner
v. Oklahoma,63 which invalidated a statute, fairly describable as "horrible," that authorized the sterilizing of larcenists (but not embezzlers!),
64
presumably on some notion of the heritability of criminal tendencies.
7. Bork believes that courts have the power to create "buffer
zone[s]" around constitutional rights "by prohibiting a government
from doing something not in itself forbidden but likely to lead to an
invasion of a right specified in the Constitution." 65 In other words,
explicit constitutional rights create penumbras of further constitutional
protection. Yet Bork is derisive about Juytice Douglas's use of the penumbra concept in Griswold6 6 and also says that a judge "may never
67
create new constitutional rights."
8. Bork even appears to believe-this is his most startling
backsliding from originalism-that "any challenged legislative distinction [must] have a rational basis" and hence that "all legislative distinctions between persons [must] be reasonable" or else stand condemned
under the equal protection clause. 68 This is the approach of Justice
Stevens, and differs from what has become (pardon the expression) the
orthodox approach because it jettisons reference to fundamental
rights. Bork hates the approach of judges' deciding which rights are
fundamental (for example, the right not to be discriminated against on
grounds of sex or by reason of illegitimate birth or of alienage, and the
right to access to the courts) and which are not (for example, the right
to an education) and giving the former more protection than the latter.
But he likes Stevens's approach. "Justice Stevens' formulation might
not in fact cause any major change in the application of the equal protection clause but it would focus judges' attention on the reasonableness of distinctions rather than on a process of simply including or
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Pp. 116-17.
P. 97.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
P. 62.
P. 97.

66. Pp. 97-99.
67. P. 147. "mhe ratifiers' creation of one set of rights is simultaneously a failure or
refusal to create more. There is no basis for extrapolating from the rights they did create to

produce rights they did not." P. 198.
68. P. 330. He means all legislative distinctions not involving race; virtually all racial
distinctions are invalid by virtue of Brown and the cases following it.
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excluding groups on criteria that can only be subjective and arbitrary."6 9 In other words, for all his fulminations against fundamental
rights jurisprudence, Bork appears to accept the bulk of modem equal
protection law.70 He just objects to the subjectivity of fundamental
rights talk compared to the (imagined) objectivity of a standard of reasonableness. He does not discuss the originalist foundations, if any, of
the Stevens approach.
Originalism's bark (at least this originalist's bark), it appears, is
worse than its bite. Originalism may indeed be completely plastic; for
besides the examples I have given, apparently it is acceptable originalist
argumentation to defend a statute that forbids defacing the American
flag by pointing out that "[n]obody pledges allegiance to the Presidential seal or salutes when it goes by."7 1 Originalism-at least Bork's
originalism-is not an analytic, but a rhetoric that can be used to support any result the judge wants to reach. The conservative libertarians
whom Bork criticizes (Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan) are
originalists; his disagreement with them is not over method, but over
result. The Dred Scott decision-to Bork, the very fount of modem
judicial activism 7 2-is permeated by originalist rhetoric. 73
We should, of course, distinguish between good originalism and
bad originalism. As Bork correctly notes, 74 the key holding of the Dred
Scott decision-that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutionalwas a straight application of substantive due process; 75 and while Bork
is not prepared to reject the possibility that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, he never
wavers in his rejection of the possibility that the clause, in either the
fifth or fourteenth amendments, might license the creation of new
rights. Yet there is a lesson, in the bad originalism, that the good
originalist may wish to ponder. Some of the most activist judges,
whether of the right or of the left, whether named Taney or Black, have
been among the judges most drawn to the rhetoric of originalism. For
69. Id
70. Though elsewhere he flirts with the idea that the equal protection clause forbids only
discrimination based on race or ethnicity. Pp. 65-66. For "the Constitution does not prohibit
laws based on prejudiceper se," and "how is the Court to know whether a particular minority
lost in the legislature because of 'prejudice,' as opposed to morality, prudence, or any other
legitimate reason?" P. 60. If this is what Bork really believes, he cannot accept Justice Stevens's view of equal protection.
71. P. 128.
72. Pp. 31-32.
73. For example:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country,
should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
74. D. CURRM, supra note 45, at 263-73.
75. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450.
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it is a magnificent disguise. Thejudge can do the wildest things, all the
while presenting himself as the passive agent of the sainted Foundersdon't argue with me, argue with Them. If originalist rhetoric could
somehow be outlawed and a Taney forced to wrestle in the open with
the pragmatics of the Missouri Compromise, maybe Dred Scott would
have been decided differently.
I have hinted, with deliberate paradox, that the problem with Bork's
originalism may be that it is not originalist enough. As a public man,
and one who quite properly tried to conciliate critics and reassure
doubters at his confirmation hearing, Bork may have disabled himself
from pressing originalism to its logical extreme; and perhaps the exigencies of writing a popular book preclude complete intellectual rigor.
For a pure originalism, a consistent originalism, a rigorous originalism,
we may have to turn elsewhere. But the impurities of Bork's originalism are a strength rather than a weakness of his book, for in his concessions to practicality and public opinion, and in other remarks scattered
throughout the book, one can find materials for constructing an alternative to strict originalism. Call it pragmatism, not in its caricatural
sense of deciding today's case with no heed for tomorrow, but in the
sense of advocating the primacy of consequences in interpretation as in
other departments of practical reason, the continuity of legal and moral
discourse, and a critical rather than pietistic attitude toward history and
tradition. 76 Introducing Bork the pragmatist:
1. "Results that are particularly awkward, in the absence of evi77
dence to the contrary, were probably not intended [by the framers]."
Bork implies that such results can and should be avoided through flexible interpretation: "The Constitution states its principles in majestic
generalities that we know
cannot be taken as sweepingly as the words
78
alone might suggest."
2. "Law will not be recognized as legitimate if it is not organically
related to 'the larger universe of moral discourse that helps shape
human behavior.' 79
3. "[H]istory is not binding, and tradition is useful to remind us of
the wisdom and folly of the past, not to chain us to either ....
Our
history and tradition, like those of any nation, display not only adher76. I defend this conception of legal pragmatism in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 52; see also Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatismto Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
(1990) (forthcoming).

77. P. 165.
78. P. 147.
79. P. 354. Bork seems unable to decide exactly what he thinks about morality. He
doubts "that there are any moral 'facts,"' p. 121, but on the next page denounces "moral
relativism," p. 122, and later denies emphatically that he is a "radical moral skeptic," p. 259.
He is equally emphatic that "[m]oral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory legislation." P. 124. His ultimate position appears to be that the raw preferences of the people have
great moral weight but that the moral views ofjudges are mere raw preferences having zero
moral weight. Pp. 125, 257, 259.
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ence to great moral principles but also instances of profound immorality."8 So obedience to the past has its pitfalls: "[N]ot all traditions are
admirable." 8 '
A judge whom Bork does not mention-Benjamin Cardozo-described the pragmatist creed in words that Bork might have done well
to ponder:
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its
aim cannot permanently justify its existence.
... Not the origin, but the goal, is the main thing. There can be no
wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know where it will lead ....
The rule that functions well produces a title deed to recognition ....
[T]he2 final principle of selection for judges ... is one of fitness to an
8
end.

The originalist faces backwards, but steals frequent sideways glances at
consequences. The pragmatist places the consequences of his decisions in the foreground. The pragmatist judge does not deny that his
role in interpreting the Constitution is interpretive. He is not a lawless
judge. He does not, in order to do short-sighted justice between the
parties, violate the Constitution and his oath, for he is mindful of the
systemic consequences ofjudicial lawlessness. Original understanding
is therefore a component of pragmatist constitutional adjudication, and
a pragmatist may therefore share, for example, Bork's reservations regarding the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of sexual freedom ("privacy"). Like Samuel Lipman's ideal conductor, however, the
pragmatist judge believes that constitutional interpretation involves the
empathic projection of the judge's mind and talent into the creative
souls of the framers rather than slavish obeisance to the framers' every
metronome marking. In the capacious, forward-looking account of interpretation that I am calling pragmatic, the social consequences of alternative interpretations are decisive; to the consistent originalist, they
are irrelevant. Those consequences include, but they are not exhausted
by, the consequences for such institutional values as maintaining the
80. P. 119. Yet on the same page, Bork remarks approvingly that "because homosexual
sodomy has been proscribed for centuries,Justice White said [in Bowers v. Hardwick] the claim
that such conduct was 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' was 'at best, facetious.'" The entire discussion is facetious, in an unintended sense. Homosexual sodomy has
been widely practiced for millennia, and in that sense is deeply rooted in every nation's history and tradition. And although it has generally but not universally been disapproved, see,
e.g., KJ. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALrry (rev. ed. 1989), efforts to suppress it have been sporadic. The verdict of history and tradition thus is ambiguous, and in any event should not be
controlling, for precisely the reasons that Bork eloquently states. Bork himself, like Justice
White, appears to regard the suggestion that efforts to suppress homosexuality might raise
constitutional questions as the reductio ad absurdum of judicial activism, for at one point he
suggests that the moral claims of homosexuals to be left in peace are no stronger than those
of kleptomaniacs. P. 204.
81. P. 235.
82. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 66, 102-03 (1921).
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intelligibility of language as a medium of communication and preserving a stable balance among the branches of government.
And speaking of consequences, I think Bork misreads the lesson of
his defeat in the Senate. He attributes it to the machinations of the
"new class"-the "knowledge class"-of left-liberal academics and
journalists.8 3 That there is such a class, that it is predominant in American universities and the mass media, and that it played a role in Bork's
defeat, all are true. But I do not think its role was decisive. The decisive factor, besides Reagan's being a lame duck crippled by the IranContra affair and the Senate's being controlled by the Democrats, was
that a large number of Americans (I do not say a majority-but passionate and articulate minorities can be very powerful in a system of representative government, and a number of otherwise conservative
Democratic Senators from the South owed their seats to black voters)
do not want the Constitution to be construed as narrowly as Bork
would construe it. They do not think that states should be allowed to
forbid abortion (Roe v. Wade,8 4 which Bork argues should be overruled)
or to enforce racial restrictive covenants (Shelley v. Kraemer,8 5 which
Bork argues was decided incorrectly). They do not think that the federal government should be free to engage in racial discrimination.
(Bork thinks that Bolling v. Sharpe,8 6 which read a duty of equal protection into the due process clause of the fifth amendment, was erroneous
87
too. ) They do not think that states should be free to enact "savage"
laws. They do not believe that ajudge should practice "moral abstention," as Bork urges.8 8 They doubt whether minorities whose rights
are not expressly protected by the Constitution should be left to the
mercy of the prejudices of the majority.8 9 They are not upset that "No
Justice renounces the power to override democratic majorities when
the Constitution is silent." 90 (Bork argues that no current member of
the Supreme Court is a genuine originalist, and, so far as appears from
the book, he does not believe that there has ever been a Supreme Court
Justice who was a consistent originalist.) They do not believe that
under ChiefJustice Rehnquist as under his predecessors "[t]he political
seduction of the law continues apace." 9 ' They do not believe that the
books should be closed on judicial innovation, preventing the creation
of new rights (which is what Bork means when he tells the Supreme
83. Pp. 337, 339.
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Bork writes that Roe v. Wade, "the greatest example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of democratic prerogatives in this century, should be overturned." P. 116.
85. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Bork believes that to apply the principle of Shelley v. Kraemer in a
neutral fashion "would be both revolutionary and preposterous." P. 153.
86. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87. P. 83.
88. P. 259.
89. See note 70 supra.
90. P. 240.
91. Id
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Court to sin "no more"). 9 2 They think results are more important than
theory and they don't like the results that Bork would be likely, on the
evidence of this book as well as of his previous writings, to reach. They
may be morally or politically immature to think such things, and they
may also have (I think they do have) an incomplete picture of the consequences of some of the decisions he criticizes. It is even possible that
the conception of law held by lay people is incoherent, because they
believe both that judges' decisions should be dictated by positive law
rather than by moral principles and that the decisions should yield resuits that conform to such principles, so that at one level they agree
both with Bork and with his arch enemy, Ronald Dworkin, and at another level they reject both. Finally, it is by no means clear that a majority of Americans agree with the particular views of policy that I have
described.
But these are details. In a representative democracy, the fact that
many (it need not be most) people do not like the probable consequences of a judge's judicial philosophy provides permissible grounds
for the people's representatives to refuse to consent to his appointment, even if popular antipathy to the judge is not grounded in a well
thought out theory of adjudication. The people are entitled to ask what
the benefits to them of originalism would be, and they will find no answers in The Tempting of America. If, to echo Samuel Lipman again,
originalism makes bad music despite or perhaps because of its scrupulous historicity, why should the people listen to it?

92. Bork repeatedly invokes stare decisis-for example, to reassure his readers that he
doesn't believe the government should be forbidden to issue paper money, whatever an
originalist interpretation of the Constitution might suggest on that score. Pp. 155-56.
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